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ABSTRACT—When Professor Martin Redish condemned abstention 
doctrines as violating norms of “institutional legitimacy,” he provoked an 
informative debate, but one that has largely subsided. This Essay revisits 
the once-heated debate about abstention’s legitimacy, clarifies its terms, 
and identifies its stakes. The legitimacy question is not whether abstention 
decisions are legally correct, but whether applicable statutes and the 
Constitution render such decisions ultra vires. Most often, the answer to 
that question is no. Recent versions of both textualist and purposivist 
theories of statutory interpretation recognize that statutory meaning always 
depends on “context.” And when relevant statutes are read in a sufficiently 
capacious semantic context (as textualists would insist) or policy context 
(as purposivists would demand), abstention emerges as justified in some 
cases. Indeed, if abstention were illegitimate, then a number of other 
federal courts doctrines—many of which are difficult to justify by 
reference either to the language of pertinent statutes or to Congress’s most 
pressing purposes in enacting them—would be illegitimate also. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed that for 
a court not to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress had conferred on it 
would constitute “treason to the constitution.”1 In the even more iconic case 
of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court rested the necessity of judicial 
review at least partly on the mandatory character of its jurisdiction.2 In 
noting that it must rule on constitutional issues to decide cases in which 
such issues arose,3 the Court did not even consider that it might, 
alternatively, respond to cases presenting constitutional issues by declining 
to exercise jurisdiction at all. Subsequent decisions have echoed similar 
themes about federal courts’ absolute, or at least nearly invariant, 
obligation to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress confers on them.4 
As is also well known, however, federal courts law includes a number 
of judge-made abstention doctrines under which federal courts do precisely 
what Cohens said they must not: although acknowledging jurisdiction over 
a case, they decline to exercise it. Perhaps the two best known abstention 
doctrines are Pullman and Younger abstention.5 Under Pullman, federal 
courts will initially decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases in which 
 
1 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3 See id. at 178 (explaining that if a law and the Constitution both apply to a case and are in 
conflict, “the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case”). 
4 See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813–14, 817 
(1976); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959).  
5 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1057–1128 (6th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (discussing Pullman and Younger abstention). 
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plaintiffs present sensitive federal constitutional claims that the resolution 
of a difficult state law issue might moot or alter.6 Instead, federal courts 
will wait for state courts to resolve the state law issues that might make the 
resolution of federal constitutional claims unnecessary. The Younger 
doctrine takes its name from Younger v. Harris, in which the Supreme 
Court held that federal courts must virtually always abstain from 
adjudicating suits seeking injunctions against pending state criminal 
proceedings.7 Subsequent cases have extended Younger abstention to 
encompass suits for injunctions against a broader array of state judicial and 
quasi-judicial proceedings,8 including some in which neither a state nor its 
officials appeared as parties.9 At Younger’s high tide during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the Court flirted with extending its bar from suits to enjoin 
judicial proceedings to suits challenging the law enforcement practices of 
state executive officials.10 
The most fundamental question about federal abstention doctrines 
involves what I shall characterize as their legal legitimacy. “Legitimacy” is 
an elusive term, which can mean different things in different contexts.11 In 
the aspect with which I am concerned, it speaks to issues of lawful 
authority rather than to questions about whether authority is exercised 
correctly, wisely, or well.12 In the case of abstention doctrines, the 
legitimacy question is whether a court that decides to abstain from deciding 
a case within its jurisdiction acts ultra vires, by making a kind of decision 
that the Constitution and applicable statutes manifestly give it no authority 
to make. If, for example, Congress has conferred jurisdiction and has 
clearly not given the courts any discretion to decline its exercise, and if the 
Constitution makes it mandatory for the federal courts to exercise all the 
jurisdiction that Congress confers, then for federal courts to abstain based 
on controversial notions of sound policy would be ultra vires and therefore 
illegitimate. By contrast, if a court has reasonably but mistakenly 
interpreted a statute or the Constitution to confer a discretion to abstain, 
when a better interpretation would find no such discretion, then a charge of 
legal illegitimacy would be too strong. The matter would involve an 
ordinary question of judgment or interpretation about which reasonable 
people could differ. An allegation that a court has acted illegitimately 
 
6 See id. at 1059–61. The Pullman doctrine originated in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
7 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). 
8 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1059 (discussing considerations supporting abstention). 
9 See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
10 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112–13 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 
379–80 (1976). 
11 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–
1801 (2005) (distinguishing legal, sociological, and moral senses of legitimacy). 
12 See id. at 1818–20. 
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registers a stronger condemnation than does a complaint about ordinary 
legal error. 
In a landmark 1984 article entitled Abstention, Separation of Powers, 
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, Professor Martin Redish levied the 
charge that abstention doctrines breach the demands of “institutional 
legitimacy,”13 apparently in the robust sense that I have just explicated. 
Abstention, he argued, constitutes a “usurpation” of Congress’s authority 
under the separation of powers.14 Redish’s article provoked an illuminating 
debate among federal courts scholars. Among the most distinguished 
contributions came from my colleague and coauthor David Shapiro.15 In an 
article entitled Jurisdiction and Discretion, Shapiro defended the 
legitimacy of the general practice of abstention—although not every aspect 
of the abstention doctrines that the Supreme Court had developed—by 
arguing that against the background of “experience and tradition,” “a grant 
of jurisdiction should normally be (and indeed generally has been) read as 
an authorization to the court to entertain an action but not as an inexorable 
command.”16 In my view, the exchange between Redish and Shapiro ranks 
among the most edifying in federal courts scholarship. 
In this Essay, I want to reexamine the question of abstention doctrine’s 
legitimacy that Professor Redish so memorably framed in 1984. Both the 
doctrine and the surrounding scholarly landscape have changed a good deal 
in the decades since Professors Redish and Shapiro first weighed in on the 
issue. Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has not only arrested the 
expansion of abstention doctrine, but also pruned some of its branches. 
Over the same period, important advances have occurred in the literature 
on statutory interpretation. As I shall try to show, these advances facilitate 
both the identification and the assessment of some of the assumptions on 
which positions about the legitimacy of abstention doctrine depend. 
An additional reason for revisiting questions about the legitimacy of 
abstention involves similarities between abstention and other federal courts 
doctrines. The somewhat freewheeling approach to statutory construction 
that the Supreme Court has taken in abstention cases—by reading statutes 
that confer jurisdiction as implicitly including a license for courts to decline 
to exercise it17—is in some ways representative of the approach that the 
 
13 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 
94 YALE L.J. 71, 115 (1984). 
14 Id. at 72, 76, 82, 88, 114. 
15 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).  
16 Id. at 574–75. 
17 In invoking equitable principles as a basis for abstention, the Court has not always adverted 
specifically to issues of statutory construction, but the assumption that Congress legislated against the 
background of equitable practice when enacting jurisdictional statutes, and therefore should be 
presumed to have anticipated that courts would continue to exercise equitable discretion, is almost 
invariably implicit even when it is not explicit. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 
706, 717 (1996) (noting that the historical practice of courts of equity in sometimes declining to 
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Court has taken in interpreting other statutes involving federal jurisdiction. 
To put the point bluntly, a number of central elements of modern 
jurisdictional doctrine rest on exercises in statutory interpretation that, at 
least at first blush, are not easy to justify by appeal to plain statutory 
language or legislative intent. Examination of the “institutional 
legitimacy”18 of the federal courts’ role in developing and applying 
abstention doctrines will, thus, open a window onto broader questions 
involving legally legitimate judicial power, especially in the federal courts 
field. 
In undertaking a reconsideration of issues framed by Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, I adopt an 
interpretive approach that is, I believe, appropriate in dealing with so iconic 
a piece of scholarship. Among other things, I shall focus my analysis of 
Professor Redish’s position almost exclusively on that trailblazing article, 
with little effort to capture changes or nuances in his views as reflected in 
subsequent writing.19 I shall also take a number of interpretive liberties in 
reading the article to find within it suggestive, incipient traces of positions 
that have subsequently achieved influence in the scholarly literatures on 
abstention and statutory interpretation. 
In the end, my substantive conclusions diverge substantially from 
those that Professor Redish advanced in 1984. Nevertheless, this Essay 
renders testimony to the continuing salience of the question that Redish put 
forward for debate and to the breadth of the resources that he brought to 
bear in answering it. Indeed, as will become clear, I believe that Redish’s 
question was not only difficult, but also deep, and that we can learn 
enormously about the judicial role in shaping federal courts and other 
doctrines by coming to terms with it. 
The Essay unfolds as follows. Part I briefly sketches some relevant 
historical background and provides a preliminary capsule summary of 
Professor Redish’s interconnected arguments that abstention doctrine 
reflects a judicial usurpation of Congress’s prerogative to establish 
jurisdictional policy. The next three Parts then examine Redish’s specific 
arguments in greater critical detail. Part II critiques Redish’s assumptions 
about proper methodology in statutory interpretation. Part III examines and 
 
exercise jurisdiction “informs our understanding of the jurisdiction Congress has conferred upon the 
federal courts”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941) (“The history of 
equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary 
remedy of the injunction. . . . This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering 
the harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional 
restriction of those powers.”). 
18 Redish, supra note 13. 
19 Cf. Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero 
Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2000) 
(proposing an expansion of abstention doctrine to deal with the problem of duplicative litigation in 
federal and state court).  
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rejects his pioneering argument that democratic theory requires the narrow-
gauged interpretive methodology that he championed. After denying that 
rule of law values categorically mark abstention doctrines as illegitimate, 
Part IV follows Redish partway, but partway only, in concluding that some 
developments in abstention doctrine during the 1970s and 1980s might 
have overstepped the bounds of proper judicial decisionmaking. 
Part V steps back to take a wider lens view of abstention, and debates 
about its legitimacy, as compared with other federal courts doctrines. 
Although abstention doctrines find little obvious support in either the 
language or the most conspicuous, animating purposes of relevant statutes, 
the same is true of a number of other doctrinal structures in the federal 
courts field. To condemn all of these doctrines as illegitimate would be 
both practically and jurisprudentially unsound. It may be equally mistaken, 
however, to conclude that the methodological assumptions that underlie all 
established doctrines would provide legally legitimate foundations for 
future decisions by the Supreme Court. So emphasizing, Part V argues that 
past practice is relevant to, but not dispositive of, questions involving the 
legitimate judicial role in interpreting jurisdictional statutes. The root 
difficulty is that all interpretation necessarily occurs in context, and there is 
no formulaic, algorithmic way to specify in advance how broadly or 
narrowly the pertinent interpretive context should be defined. Legitimate 
judging requires good judgment, even when reasonable people reasonably 
disagree about what good judgment requires. Although I do not claim to be 
able to resolve this conundrum, I hope, by taking up Professor Redish’s 
question, to move us toward a better understanding of its nature. 
I. PROFESSOR REDISH’S CHALLENGE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF 
ABSTENTION: CONTEXT AND CONTENT 
In order to capture the significance and originality of Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, it may be 
useful for me to begin with a short, opinionated sketch of the context in 
which Professor Redish wrote in 1984. Having done so, I shall then offer a 
preliminary statement of the article’s central claims. 
A. Abstention Doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s 
At least three bits of context deserve attention. First, Professor Redish 
published Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function at a time when abstention was perhaps the hottest, most 
contentious topic in the federal courts curriculum. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the Burger Court expanded abstention doctrines along several dimensions. 
The largest developments came in Younger doctrine. In a series of 
decisions, the Court extended the prohibition of federal injunctions against 
pending state criminal proceedings to encompass civil cases brought by 
state officials to enforce state law, civil disputes between private parties in 
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which important state interests were at stake, and state administrative 
proceedings of a judicial nature.20 As noted above, a couple of cases 
invoked Younger to foreclose federal injunctive relief against alleged police 
misconduct.21 The Burger Court also gave renewed vitality to Pullman 
doctrine, which the Warren Court had never questioned, but for which it 
had not shown great enthusiasm either.22 With Pullman much in the 
consciousness of bench and bar alike, several of the Justices sought to 
expand that doctrine significantly beyond its traditional reach by 
authorizing abstention in any case in which a party’s claim to relief under 
state constitutional law had the potential to moot a federal constitutional 
claim.23 Because most state constitutions contain bills of rights analogous to 
the federal Bill of Rights, there are few cases presenting federal 
constitutional issues in which state constitutional claims could not also be 
raised.24 In addition, a 1976 decision, Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States,25 launched a new abstention doctrine of initially 
uncertain scope. Although the opinion included a paean to the federal 
courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation”26 to exercise jurisdiction 
conferred, the result—refusal to hear a case—spoke louder than qualifying 
rhetoric. 
Second, within the political and jurisprudential climate of the 1970s 
and 1980s, the themes of judicial federalism that the Burger Court sounded 
in its abstention decisions had potential relevance in a number of broader, 
ongoing debates, both among the Justices and within the legal academy. 
One involved the comparative weight of federal interests in the prompt and 
efficacious enforcement of federal rights and state interests in 
noninterference with state judicial and law enforcement functions.27 A 
related question concerned judicial “parity”: from either a constitutional or 
an empirical perspective, should state courts be viewed as fungible with 
federal courts?28 Many of the most important statutes defining the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts have their origins in Reconstruction 
legislation that reflected Congress’s suspicion of state courts’ capacity or 
 
20 For a survey, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1121–28. 
21 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
22 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1065. 
23 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 442–43 (1971) (Burger, C.J., joined by 
Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 443–44 (Black, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
24 Frequently, however, state court interpretations of state constitutional provisions will reflect and 
be driven by the federal courts’ interpretation of parallel federal constitutional provisions. See HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 462–80. 
25 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
26 Id. at 817. 
27 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1151–64 
(1988) (tracing the assumptions of competing “Nationalist” and “Federalist” models reflected in 
Supreme Court decisions).  
28 See id. at 1153–54, 1161–62. 
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willingness to enforce federal rights fairly.29 Suspicion of state courts 
persisted through much of the civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 
1960s. By the 1970s and 1980s, some thought a new day had arrived in 
which state courts deserved more trust and respect.30 Others continued to 
believe federal courts indispensable to the effective enforcement of federal 
constitutional and statutory rights.31 
Third, the Burger Court was methodologically undisciplined.32 Its 
predecessor, the Warren Court, had been widely regarded as both liberal 
and activist. While the Burger Court was more conservative, it 
disappointed those who had expected a more methodologically rigorous 
approach. Its Justices inhabited not only a post-Realist, but also a post-
Warren Court, legal universe in which much seemed up for grabs. The 
Court’s leading liberal, William Brennan, used to inform his law clerks that 
the most important number in the Supreme Court was five, because with 
five votes, he said, anything was possible.33 The Court’s staunchest 
conservative, William Rehnquist, seemed no more disciplined by concerns 
about methodological consistency.34 What would come to be called 
constitutional “originalism” remained in its gestational stages.35 “The new 
textualism” had not yet emerged as a theory of statutory interpretation.36 
Many thought the Burger Court “rootless[ly] activis[t].”37 Whether or not 
the Burger Court’s abstention decisions were “rootless,” their expansive, 
pathbreaking character certainly invited the label “activist,” however 
analytically imprecise that term may be. 
 
29 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (explaining that Reconstruction 
legislation was a reaction against the use of state courts “to harass and injure individuals, either because 
the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon 
abrogation of federally protected rights”). 
30 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 605, 631 (1981) (arguing that the view of state courts as less protective of constitutional 
rights “derive[s] primarily from a special historical experience, involving the division of the country on 
the issue of racial segregation, which is no longer of dominating significance in governing the attitudes 
of state court judges”).  
31 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).  
32 See generally Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT: 
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 198, 215 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (observing that the 
Burger Court “charted a middle course demarcated by numerous fine, unconvincing distinctions”). 
33 See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF 
JUDICIAL DECISION 16 (2008). 
34 See David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 299 
(1976) (arguing that “[t]oo often” Justice Rehnquist’s “unyielding insistence on a particular result 
appears to have contributed to a wide discrepancy between theory and practice in matters of 
constitutional interpretation”).  
35 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923, 926–39 (2009) (tracing the development of originalism from the early 1970s through 2009). 
36 On “the new texualism,” see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 621 (1990). 
37 See Blasi, supra note 32. 
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With a methodologically undisciplined Supreme Court having a pro-
federalism agenda that prominently included a fascination with abstention 
doctrine, no one knew in 1984 how abstention’s future might unfold. As 
Professor Redish surveyed the landscape, the Court had so far followed 
what he characterized as a “partial abstention model”38 that required federal 
courts to abstain only in cases that satisfied the expanding but still limited 
criteria of Pullman, Younger, and other specific abstention doctrines. But 
burgeoning themes in the Court’s opinions led him to fear that the Justices 
might adopt a “total abstention model,”39 which would have called for 
federal courts always to decline to adjudicate federal constitutional claims 
whenever the claimants had fair opportunities to present their grievances to 
state tribunals. Accordingly, Redish devoted large chunks of Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function to 
demolishing the purported justifications for total abstention. 
B. Professor Redish’s Arguments 
As I read Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function, its argument had three interrelated components. I shall 
set them out more fully below when I separately and critically examine 
each in turn. Before doing so, however, I need to place all three 
preliminarily on the table, for not to do so would risk unfairness. For one 
thing, Redish’s arguments flow so seamlessly into one another that it is 
sometimes difficult to pry them apart. For another, they provide each other 
with mutual support. 
With all of these caveats, I would preliminarily state Redish’s three 
arguments as follows: 
First, abstention doctrines cannot be justified as a matter of ordinary 
statutory interpretation. The relevant statutes confer jurisdiction without 
reference to abstention.40 When Congress vested jurisdiction, there was no 
reason to think that Congress meant to authorize federal courts to decline to 
exercise the jurisdiction conferred.41 
Second, as a matter of democratic theory, Congress, rather than the 
federal courts, should make the fundamental decisions about jurisdictional 
policy.42 For the courts to claim an inherent power to abstain, or to treat 
every jurisdictional statute as if it included an authorization for them to do 
so, was a usurpation of policymaking prerogatives that the Constitution 
rightly vested in Congress.43 And for courts to adopt interpretive principles 
that presumed a congressional intent to vest the courts with broad 
 
38 See Redish, supra note 13, at 75. 
39 Id. at 105. 
40 See id. at 71. 
41 See id. at 77. 
42 See id. at 74, 76. 
43 See id. at 76–77. 
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discretion was wholly insupportable.44 This approach not only misgauged 
what reasonable Congresses almost certainly would have wanted, but also 
shifted policymaking responsibility from the democratically accountable 
legislature to the unaccountable judiciary. 
Third—and this is the point on which I take the greatest liberties—the 
Supreme Court’s aggressive, controversial, and divisive practice in crafting 
and expanding abstention doctrines contravened rule of law ideals. 
Abstention doctrines not only lacked foundations in statutory or 
constitutional language, but also represented judicial policymaking 
undisciplined by the traditional strictures of “legal process.”45 Absent 
restraining mechanisms that the Court had failed to develop, the judgments 
that underlay abstention doctrine too closely resembled naked policy 
preferences, asserted in the teeth of apparently contrary congressional 
dictates, for the entire body of abstention law not to stand condemned. 
Rather than constituting mutually supporting precedents, leading cases 
establishing the various doctrines were spreading manifestations of a 
dangerous pathology in the understanding and exercise of judicial power. 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Professor Redish’s statutory interpretation argument—that pertinent 
statutes did not authorize abstention but instead prohibited it—can be 
reconstructed as unfolding in four steps. First, none of the statutes involved 
in abstention cases includes any express authorization for abstention.46 
Second, when Congress confers jurisdiction, it ordinarily means, and 
should be understood as meaning, to mandate the exercise of jurisdiction.47 
Third, although implied authorizations of abstention are not logically 
impossible, separation of powers principles require “a heavy burden of 
proof on one who would assert that [Congress] implicitly intended to allow 
the judiciary to amend unlimited legislation.”48 Fourth, with the burden of 
proof thus located, there is no evidence whatsoever that Congress intended 
to give the federal courts total discretion about whether to abstain: 
The language of the relevant statutes leaves no room for judicial limitation or 
modification—certainly no more so than the language of other jurisdictional 
statutes. Moreover, the very purpose of [the Reconstruction] legislation 
[often involved in abstention cases] was to interpose the federal judiciary 
between the state and individual, largely because of concern about the 
functioning of state judiciaries.49 
 
44 See id. at 78–79. 
45 Id. at 74, 102. 
46 See id. at 71, 84. 
47 See id. at 81–82, 112–13. 
48 Id. at 78. 
49 Id. at 84. 
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To assess this argument, one first needs to identify the theory of 
statutory interpretation that it reflects. In a 1991 book entitled The Federal 
Courts in the Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction and American Political 
Theory,50 Professor Redish advanced a theory of statutory interpretation 
that places great reliance on statutory purpose.51 In 1984, he, like most of 
the American legal academy, was less clear and apparently less self-
conscious about statutory interpretive methodology.52 Throughout 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 
he relied on a mix of sometimes undifferentiated appeals to the relatively 
plain meaning of relevant statutory texts and to statutes’ purposes. 
Although that mixed approach would have raised few eyebrows in 
1984, over the past twenty-five years, scholars have labored zealously and 
often insightfully to distinguish purpose-based and text-based theories of 
statutory interpretation. Modern purposivist theories characteristically draw 
their inspiration from, and seek to refine, an approach initially developed 
during the 1950s by Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.53 According 
to Hart and Sacks, judges should begin by reading statutes carefully and 
then “conjure up plausible organizing purposes for” them,54 predicated on 
the assumption that the legislature consisted of “reasonable persons 
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”55 As both purposivists and their 
critics have emphasized, an approach that calls for judges to reconstruct the 
purposes or intentions of reasonable legislators contrasts sharply, at least in 
some cases, with more rigidly text-focused theories, which purport to be 
more concerned with what statutes say than with what individual legislators 
meant or intended to do when enacting them. 
Within the textualist camp, scholars have come to distinguish between 
a “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation and a so-called “new 
textualism.”56 The plain meaning school maintains that the implications of 
statutory language are often unmistakable to any competent speaker of 
English and that, when the linguistic import is clear, a statute’s plain 
meaning conclusively determines its application. New textualist theories 
 
50 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION 
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY (1991). 
51 See id. at 19–28. 
52 See generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 242 (1992) (noting that in the 1970s and early 1980s 
“[h]ardly anybody in legal academe thought that something useful could be said about the interpretation 
of statutes in general”). 
53 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation 
Press 1994) (1958). 
54 Frickey, supra note 52, at 249. 
55 HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 1374–80. 
56 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73, 
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also insist on the centrality of statutory language but acknowledge that texts 
can have meaning only in context.57 According to new textualists, Congress 
invariably legislates against the background of a number of linguistic and 
cultural understandings that influence, and indeed determine, what a 
linguistically competent person would understand a statute to say.58 
Two examples may illustrate the new textualist position. As Judge 
Easterbrook, a pioneering exemplar of the new textualism, has written, 
statutes defining criminal offenses and prescribing criminal penalties 
characteristically presuppose the availability of traditional defenses such as 
insanity and “necessity”: 
 For thousands of years, and in many jurisdictions, criminal statutes have 
been understood to operate only when the acts were unjustified. The agent 
who kills a would-be assassin of the Chief Executive is justified, though the 
killing be willful; so too with the person who kills to save his own life. . . . 
The process [by which courts interpret statutes in light of historical context] 
is cooperative: norms of interpretation and defense, like agreement on 
grammar and diction, make it easier to legislate at the same time as they 
promote the statutory aim of saving life.59 
Justice Scalia, another leader in the development of the new textualism, has 
similarly emphasized that “Congress must be presumed to draft . . . in light 
of . . . background [legal] principle[s],”60 including those that call for 
criminal statutes to retain the common law requirement of mens rea,61 for 
statutes not to apply extraterritorially to noncitizens,62 and for limitations 
periods to be “subject to ‘equitable tolling.’”63 In the view of Justice Scalia 
as much as Judge Easterbrook, it would be unreasonable, if not impossible, 
to demand that Congress replicate as much of the legal universe as it 
wishes to retain whenever it enacts a new statute. Background legal 
understandings are therefore nearly as pertinent to statutory interpretation 
as rules of grammar and syntax. 
As I shall explain below, the plain meaning and new textualist 
approaches blur into one another along a spectrum. In Abstention, 
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, Professor 
Redish’s text-based arguments stood close to the plain meaning end. 
Nevertheless, in anticipation of the new textualists, he acknowledged the 
relevance of historical context.64 Indeed, in light of longstanding equitable 
 
57 See id. at 79–80. 
58 See id. at 92–93, 100–01. 
59 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1913, 1913–14 (1999). 
60 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002). 
61 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998). 
62 See id. 
63 Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). 
64 See Redish, supra note 13, at 85. 
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maxims that sometimes required the equivalent of abstention—for 
example, the maxim that courts should not grant equitable relief except in 
cases of “irreparable injury”—Redish credited the argument that relevant 
statutes should be read as authorizing abstention in conformity with 
traditional equitable principles.65 In refuting the argument that the relevant 
statutes contemplated a more general judicial discretion to abstain, he did 
not deny the pertinence of established understandings of courts’ equitable 
discretion. He argued instead that traditional equitable principles could not 
justify the abstention doctrines at which he directed his attack because 
those doctrines aimed to promote federalism values.66 Federalism, Redish 
wrote, was a value unknown to historic courts of equity.67 Accordingly, he 
thought, it could not justify federalism-based abstention. 
In my view, Redish was right to concede—in line with new textualist 
thinking—that the permissibility of abstention as a matter of statutory 
interpretation depends on historical practice and the assumptions that 
historical practice reflected. The alternative would be untenable. If 
Congress legislated against a background in which courts had long 
exercised equitable discretion, a linguistically competent and legally 
informed interpreter of its legislative output might reasonably assume that 
Congress would have expected equitable discretion to continue to exist. 
Yet that concession, which seems to me to be unavoidable, also seems 
fatal to any purely textual argument that abstention was not just mistaken, 
but also legally illegitimate, more or less across the board. In order to 
behave in accordance with the tradition of equitable discretion, courts must 
identify, interpret, and apply that tradition. The effort to do so can of course 
give rise to debate and disagreement about which interpretations and 
applications are correct or even colorable. Nevertheless, once one 
acknowledges the need for courts to interpret and apply traditional 
equitable principles in determining when to exercise and when to refrain 
from exercising their jurisdiction, the charge that all forms of abstention 
doctrine are “usurpation[s]” of legislative power, outside the bounds of 
properly judicial authority to define or enforce, crumbles. 
In maintaining otherwise, Redish insisted that “traditional equitable 
principles” were subject to clear limitations that abstention doctrines 
inherently and manifestly transgressed. But his argument to that effect was 
deeply embarrassed by the traditional equitable maxim, which provided the 
foundation for the core of Younger abstention doctrine, that forbade courts 
of equity to enjoin pending criminal prosecutions.68 In characterizing 
Younger as an illegitimate usurpation, Redish maintained that the 
prohibition against enjoining pending criminal prosecutions originated in 
 
65 See id. at 85, 91. 
66 See id. at 85–86. 
67 See id. 
68 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
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the unitary British system, and therefore had no application to cases in 
which federal courts were asked to enjoin state courts within the context of 
American federalism.69 Although I am doubtful about the persuasiveness of 
this interpretive claim on the merits, there is no need to debate that issue 
here. Whether or not one judges Redish to be ultimately persuasive that the 
traditional anti-injunction maxim should be judged inapplicable when 
federal courts are asked to enjoin state courts, the question clearly lies 
within the jurisdiction of federal courts to make and is one about which 
reasonable people might differ. Allegations of usurpation, ultra vires 
action, and illegitimacy thus seem misplaced. 
Beyond inferences drawn from statutory text, Abstention, Separation 
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function appealed to 
congressional intent or statutory purposes. Much of the pertinent legislation 
was enacted by Reconstruction Congresses. Beyond any shadow of doubt, 
Reconstruction defined a “policy context”70 in which reasonable legislators 
would have had the goal of increasing the availability of federal courts to 
enforce federal rights based on a suspicion of state officials and state 
courts. Given this policy goal, Redish argued, reasonable members of 
Congress surely would not have wished to authorize federal courts to 
reverse or dilute the policy judgment that people complaining of federal 
rights violations should have access to a federal forum.71 
Professor Redish is undoubtedly correct that it would make no sense to 
imagine “reasonable” Reconstruction legislators authorizing complete 
judicial nullification of legislation intended to establish the federal courts 
as guardians of federal rights.72 But it is a separate question whether 
reasonable legislators—“reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably,”73 as Hart and Sacks would have said—would have wanted to 
permit the federal courts, acting within principled bounds, to accommodate 
the statutes’ principal policy goals with other values of enduring concern, 
including federalism values in some cases. This is a hard and perhaps 
impossible question to answer without making value judgments. So 
acknowledging, I tend to agree with Professor Shapiro that the question of 
whether abstention is consistent with congressional purposes in enacting 
jurisdictional statutes to protect federal rights “is difficult, if not 
impossible, to answer in gross”74 and that one must get down to cases. The 
development of narrowly crafted abstention principles differs from the de 
facto nullification of a jurisdictional grant. Without wanting to defend 
everything that the Supreme Court has done in developing abstention 
 
69 See Redish, supra note 13, at 85–86.  
70 I borrow the term from Manning, supra note 56, at 92. 
71 See Redish, supra note 13, at 110–11. 
72 See id. at 111. 
73 HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 1374–80. 
74 Shapiro, supra note 15, at 574. 
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doctrines, I would conclude once again that Redish’s stringent position that 
there is no room for reasonable interpretive debate about whether 
abstention is consistent with congressional purpose or intent in Pullman- or 
Younger-type cases goes too far. 
In so saying, I know that I have so far overlooked Redish’s claim that 
the burden of proof on this question rests on one who believes that 
reasonable legislators would have wished to preserve any judicial 
discretion whatsoever75—an argument to which I shall come shortly. For 
now, I mean only to argue that without that contestable presumption about 
the burden of proof, the most that Redish’s other arguments could hope to 
establish is that abstention doctrines rest on an erroneous interpretation of 
the relevant jurisdictional statutes, not that doctrines such as Pullman and 
Younger are wholly ultra vires. 
At the risk of piling on, I would cite another pertinent consideration 
that Professor Redish’s 1984 article never addressed directly: stare decisis. 
In a subsequent book, Redish dismissed appeals to stare decisis by saying 
that the Supreme Court can overrule its precedents.76 As a general matter, 
this assertion is true enough. But it is one thing to overrule a single 
precedent and another to tear up long-entrenched doctrines root and branch. 
In constitutional law, precedent is most important when settled 
expectations have developed in reliance on doctrines that have, over time, 
become woven into the fabric not only of the law, but also of surrounding 
political and social life.77 In my view, the Younger rule that federal courts 
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions reflects the kind of 
settlement of a once-contentious issue, the upsetting of which would have 
potentially dramatic repercussions, that should command respect today as a 
matter of stare decisis, even if one believed it mistaken as an original 
matter.78 
When all these considerations are cumulated, I agree with Professor 
Redish that sensible statutory interpretation would limit the scope of 
abstention doctrine. And I do not mean to suggest that the Supreme Court 
has specified the applicable limits correctly in every instance. But the 
question that Redish framed for discussion involved the legitimacy, not the 
ultimate correctness, of decisions establishing abstention doctrines. Insofar 
as the question is whether all abstention doctrines are categorically 
illegitimate, the answer is no—at least unless Redish was correct that 
anyone who wants to establish the legitimacy of abstention doctrines must 
 
75 See Redish, supra note 13, at 78–79. 
76 See REDISH, supra note 50, at 44–45. 
77 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1148–50 (2008).  
78 For a brisk survey of materials bearing on whether Younger was correctly decided as an original 
matter, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1091–96. 
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bear a special, heavy burden of proof.79 It is to his arguments on this point, 
involving political democracy, that I now must turn. 
III. DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
As I have noted, Professor Redish’s statutory interpretation arguments 
rely on a burden-shifting premise that he defends partly on grounds of 
democratic political theory. The relation of democratic theory to statutory 
interpretation begins to come into focus when one recognizes—as all 
leading modern theories of statutory interpretation acknowledge—that 
statutes must always be interpreted in context.80 According to my colleague 
John Manning, the principal difference between new textualist and 
purposivist theories involves the elements of context that they find most 
salient. “Textualists,” he writes, “give primacy to the semantic context—
evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social 
and linguistic practices would have used the words.”81 By contrast, 
“[p]urposivists give precedence to policy context—evidence that goes to 
the way a reasonable person conversant with the circumstances underlying 
enactment [of a statute] would suppress the mischief [at which the statute 
aims] and advance the remedy.”82 
Although no precise metric of measurement exists, both textualists and 
purposivists could view the contexts that they take to be relevant to 
statutory interpretation either more or less broadly. Among textualists, 
adherents of the older “plain meaning” tradition sought to ascertain how an 
intelligent and linguistically adept person would understand the words of a 
statute without having much, if any, specialized knowledge about legal 
history or traditions.83 By contrast, new textualists, as noted above, adopt a 
more capacious view of the relevant context, under which traditional legal 
practice can be highly relevant. Similarly, purposivists can take a more or 
less capacious view of a statute’s policy context. One might think of the 
mischief that a statute set out to remedy or the central value that it sought to 
promote as exclusively defining its policy context. Alternatively, one might 
broaden the lens to take account of the entire range of values—some of 
which might actually be in tension with one another—that reasonable 
legislators who voted to enact a statute could reasonably be expected to 
have held. 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function included both textualist and purposivist elements, but it took a 
narrow view of both the relevant semantic and the relevant policy context. 
 
79 See Redish, supra note 13, at 78–79. 
80 See Manning, supra note 56, at 79–80 (discussing the importance of context for textualism and 
purposivism). 
81 Id. at 91. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 79 & n.28. 
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As I reconstruct its underlying logic, the article relied on considerations of 
democratic theory to justify this methodological choice. Read loosely, but I 
think reasonably sympathetically, Redish appears to have thought that 
Congress can discharge its lawmaking function most effectively if it is 
taken at its relatively plain words and if its central, animating purposes in 
enacting legislation are the only ones treated as relevant in characterizing 
the policy context in which it acted. To put the point in more negative 
terms, an interpretive methodology that employs a narrow definition of the 
interpretive context minimizes the risk that courts, by appealing to a 
broader range of considerations, will increase their interpretive discretion 
and usurp policymaking powers that appropriately belong to Congress. 
What Philip Frickey once wrote about purposivist theories that take a broad 
view of the relevant policy context could easily be adapted to apply as well 
to textualists who hold capacious understandings of the pertinent semantic 
context: “[I]f I ask what ‘reasonable people pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably’ would have wanted in a given context, am I not likely to 
assume that those reasonable people are similar to the reasonable person I 
know best—myself—and, thus, would want what I think is the right 
answer?”84 If Redish’s argument from democratic theory stands up, it 
would support his preference for a narrowly defined interpretive context 
and for his premise that a “separation-of-powers principle should be 
deemed to impose a heavy burden of proof on one who would assert that a 
legislative body implicitly intended to allow the judiciary to amend 
unlimited legislation.”85 
Although Professor Redish’s argument from democratic theory is 
subtle and sophisticated, in my view it ultimately proves unpersuasive. In 
explaining why, let me begin with the normative argument in favor of 
judicial discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction that David Shapiro 
asserted in his 1985 reply to Redish. Shapiro argued, in essence, that 
recognition of judicial discretion to develop abstention doctrines has left us 
with a better, more finely tuned body of law than we otherwise would 
have.86 According to Shapiro, judicial discretion, and judicial abstention as 
a subcategory thereof, were justified by their fruits as well as by their 
historical pedigrees. 
For reasons that I shall briefly describe below, I am inclined to agree 
with Shapiro that the benefits of well-designed abstention doctrines would 
exceed the costs and, more generally, that courts often have an important 
role to play in so interpreting statutes as to render them sensible and 
workable. For now, however, I want simply to assume that he was correct 
on this point in order to reach a more fundamental question of principle that 
Professor Redish also sought to frame. Although Redish took a deeply 
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skeptical view of the purported benefits of federal abstention doctrines,87 
and thus disagreed with Professor Shapiro’s assessment that judge-made 
doctrine gave us better law than we would have had otherwise, Redish also 
argued that considerations of legal legitimacy—as defined by interpretive 
principles crafted to maximize democratic legitimacy—would suffice to 
condemn abstention regardless of the balance of policy arguments. 
Despite Redish’s having maintained that democratic theory justifies 
imposing the burden of proof on anyone who seeks to defend a 
nontextually based judicial discretion to abstain, Shapiro’s response said 
almost nothing explicit about issues of democratic theory. Obviously, 
however, Shapiro must have disagreed with Redish’s belief that concerns 
of legal legitimacy and democratic theory provided him with the functional 
equivalent of a trump card. There are at least two possible grounds on 
which Shapiro might have supported his position. 
First, although democracy is undoubtedly a value of constitutional 
stature, it is not the only constitutional value. Within a basically democratic 
political system—which Shapiro assumed that we have—it might make 
sense, at the margins, to trade a relatively small sacrifice of democratic 
control for substantially enhanced policy outcomes. (In an analogous 
situation, the maintenance of an independent Federal Reserve Board 
reflects a minor sacrifice of democratic accountability that most think 
justified by gains in the promotion of other values.) 
Second, Professor Shapiro might have maintained, as I believe, that 
the debate about the justifiability of abstention doctrines does not 
necessarily require us to choose between an interpretive principle that 
supports political democracy and an alternative that treats the achievement 
of fine-tuned jurisdictional legislation as more important. With both 
abstention and other forms of judicial discretion being deeply embedded in 
longstanding tradition and current legal doctrine, I would interpret 
Shapiro—reading his article as liberally as I have read Professor 
Redish’s—as resisting the claim that judge-made abstention doctrines 
necessarily involve deviations from democratic ideals. “Democracy” 
admits of many conceptions or interpretations, not every one of which is 
maximally populist.88 As Shapiro wrote in a subsequent article, “our 
complex democracy” can be understood as presupposing that “courts have 
a unique responsibility to accommodate change to a complex and relatively 
stable structure of rules and principles.”89 Certainly it would impose a huge, 
potentially unmanageable burden on Congress if it could not embody its 
 
87 See Redish, supra note 13, at 91–98. 
88 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
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central policy judgments in relatively succinct legislation and rely on the 
courts to work out interstitial details in light of preexisting law.90 If a 
conception of democracy that welcomes discretion-conferring 
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes not only tends to produce better law 
than a conception that insists on narrower, discretion-denying 
interpretations, but also makes it more feasible for Congress to legislate, I 
see no a priori reason to prefer the latter to the former—provided, of 
course, that the tolerance for judicial discretion does not get so far out of 
hand as to invite too close an approximation of government by judiciary. In 
his reply to Redish, Professor Shapiro argued explicitly that discretion and 
abstention should not get too far out of hand.91 
If this analysis is correct, then Professor Redish’s invocation of 
democracy and electoral accountability was not the kind of conversation 
stopper that he imagined. The rivals whose views he sought to vanquish 
were not necessarily anti-democrats but adherents of a different conception 
of democracy—one that emphasizes the role of courts in facilitating 
legislation by so interpreting new enactments as to render them consistent 
with surrounding law and the values that surrounding law expresses. Or so 
I would insist on their behalf. Among the enduring contributions of 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function 
was to introduce issues of political theory into what had previously 
appeared to be garden-variety debates about the desirability of abstention 
as a matter of policy. 
IV. WHAT ABOUT THE RULE OF LAW? 
Professor Redish’s argument that abstention involved judicial 
usurpation of congressional prerogatives sounded partly in terms of a 
democratic preference for legislative decisionmaking, but it also included 
related themes of protest against judicial power run amok. Those themes 
emerged in the extended condemnation in Abstention, Separation of 
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function of two Supreme Court 
decisions that did not, on their faces, involve abstention at all. 
As Redish emphasized, the Supreme Court’s development of the 
Younger abstention doctrine was abetted by, and indeed depended on, a 
tendentious interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act,92 which could easily 
have been read as a statutory bar to federal injunctions against most state 
judicial proceedings.93 If the Supreme Court had so interpreted the Anti-
Injunction Act, then the nonexercise of federal jurisdiction would have 
 
90 See Easterbrook, supra note 59 (noting that norms of interpretation that call for new legislation 
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reflected the acknowledgment of a congressional mandate, not the 
application of discretionary, judge-made doctrines. But the Anti-Injunction 
Act includes several exceptions, including one applicable to injunctions 
“expressly authorized” by Congress. In Mitchum v. Foster,94 the Court held 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes an “expressly authorized” exception to 
the anti-injunction mandate, even though § 1983 makes no specific mention 
of injunctions against state judicial proceedings. In Abstention, Separation 
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, Professor Redish 
mocked the idea of an “express authorization” that was implicit rather than 
explicit as a contradiction in terms.95 In his view, only a naked and 
discreditable result orientation could explain the Court’s ruling. By holding 
that Congress had not mandated abstention in Younger-type cases, Mitchum 
preserved the Court’s authority, which it had already asserted in Younger to 
prescribe abstention when, but only when, the Justices (rather than 
Congress) deemed abstention appropriate. 
Professor Redish also devoted a substantial section of his article to 
attacking the Supreme Court’s decision in Parratt v. Taylor,96 which 
purported to rest on an interpretation of the Due Process Clause. According 
to Parratt, when state officials engage in random and unauthorized 
misconduct, the only “process” that a state can reasonably be required to 
provide, and thus the only process that the Due Process Clause demands, is 
a post-deprivation hearing in state court.97 Redish characterized Parratt’s 
constitutional reasoning as flatly indefensible.98 In his view, Parratt was a 
de facto abstention holding, which required federal courts to defer to actual 
or potential actions in state court. 
By linking his attack on abstention with other criticisms of 
methodologically undisciplined, result-driven judicial decisionmaking, 
Redish drew upon rule of law ideals that require judges, as much as other 
officials, to act in accordance with established law. More particularly, 
Redish relied on the idea of “legal process,”99 and the discipline to which it 
subjects judges, as a central element of his indictment against abstention 
doctrines. As I read him—liberally and loosely, I acknowledge—Redish 
presented the objection that abstention doctrines, and especially the “total 
abstention” model that he thought some of the Justices as well as some 
commentators favored, had come so unloosed from the traditional 
disciplines of law and the “legal process” that they affronted the ideal of 
the rule of law. “The rule of law” is a complex, contested ideal that 
 
94 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972). 
95 See Redish, supra note 13, at 87 (characterizing the Court’s notion of “an ‘implied’ express 
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96 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
97 See id. at 543–44. 
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undoubtedly means different things to different people.100 But it is surely 
intelligible to believe that judicial decisionmaking that is neither tightly 
constrained by preexisting authorities nor disciplined by exacting norms of 
judicial craft and intellectual integrity reflects an objectionable betrayal of 
rule of law ideals. 
If I am correct that Professor Redish’s attack on abstention and 
surrounding doctrines included a strand of rule-of-law-based 
argumentation, then David Shapiro’s rejoinder on this point makes a 
fascinating contrast. First, Shapiro contended that not all abstention 
doctrines do constitute judicial lawmaking in defiance of legal process 
ideals.101 Through a patient recitation of multiple examples, he attempted to 
demonstrate that “far from amounting to judicial usurpation, open 
acknowledgment of reasoned discretion is wholly consistent with the 
Anglo-American legal tradition” and with the legal process ideals that 
underlie it.102 Second, in a more normative vein, he offered an account of 
what discretionary judicial decisionmaking ought to be: 
[N]othing in our history or traditions permits a court to interpret a normal 
grant of jurisdiction as conferring unbridled authority to hear cases simply at 
its pleasure. Authority to act necessarily implies a correlative responsibility. 
Thus when jurisdiction is conferred, I believe there is at least a “principle of 
preference” that a court should entertain and resolve on its merits an action 
within the scope of the jurisdictional grant. For this preference to yield in a 
particular case, the court must provide an explanation based on the language 
of the grant, the historical context in which the grant was made, or the 
common law tradition behind it.103 
Abstention doctrines crafted in conformity with that account, he suggested, 
would accord wholly with properly interpreted legal process and rule of 
law ideals.104 Tellingly, however, Professor Shapiro attempted no case-by-
case defense of the Burger Court’s then-ongoing expansion of previously 
established abstention doctrines. 
In my view, Professor Redish’s rule of law critique of the Supreme 
Court’s practice in developing and extending abstention doctrines was a 
timely one in 1984. Its aptness came from the frequently freewheeling 
approaches to both constitutional and statutory interpretation that largely 
predominated in the 1970s and 1980s. Not terribly long before Redish’s 
article, the Court’s methodologically undisciplined decisionmaking in 
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101 See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 545–74 (showing “that the existence of . . . discretion is much 
more pervasive than is generally realized, and that it has ancient and honorable roots at common law as 
well as in equity”). 
102 Id. at 545. 
103 Id. at 575 (footnote omitted). 
104 See id. at 579–85. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
868 
constitutional cases, perhaps as most famously reflected in Roe v. Wade,105 
provoked John Ely’s celebrated critique106 and helped to inspire the 
originalist movement.107 A similar yearning for interpretive discipline 
contributed to the rebirth of interest in theories of statutory interpretation, 
including the “new textualism.” 
In the prevailing jurisprudential climate of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
rule of law anxieties seem to me to have been as well placed in an 
assessment of abstention doctrine as in criticisms of the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence. As the Burger Court sought to revitalize 
constitutional federalism, Younger abstention doctrine, in particular, grew 
like Topsy.108 And some of the expansions seemed much more driven by 
free-floating and even ad hoc ideas of sound policy than by principles 
reflected in, or even consistent with, preexisting authorities. When the 
Court held in Rizzo v. Goode109 and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons110 that 
Younger principles—which originated in notions of deference to state 
judicial proceedings—might bar injunctions against alleged police 
misconduct, the editors of Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System—who then included Professor Paul Bator, generally a 
stalwart among academic defenders of doctrines of judicial federalism—
were aghast. Their damning response (characteristically) took the form of a 
rhetorical question: “Do you understand the content of a rule that would 
take the Younger doctrine of non-interference with state judicial 
proceedings and convert it by analogy into a principle of non-interference 
with state executive officials?”111 
In endorsing this critique, I acknowledge that difficult issues loom just 
below the surface. Anyone who assumes that jurisdictional statutes should 
be interpreted in light of previously recognized equitable and other 
exceptions (such as the forum non conveniens doctrine112), as I do, must 
face an inevitable question about how to interpret or specify the pertinent 
prior practice. Unless history definitively fixes the list of permissible 
exceptions, the relevant practice could be characterized, at the limit, as one 
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108 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1121–28 (detailing extensions of the 
Younger doctrine). 
109 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
110 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
111 PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1432 (3d ed. 1988). 
112 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1426–30 (discussing contemporary federal 
doctrine and the traditional, underlying notion that a court may, when an alternative forum is available, 
decline to exercise jurisdiction if the convenience of the defendant and witnesses and the interests of 
justice would make the alternative forum more appropriate). 
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in which courts have crafted exceptions to jurisdictional grants whenever 
they believed such exceptions would constitute good policy. Although that 
characterization seems to me to go too far, I doubt—as I shall explain more 
fully below—that it is possible to give an adequate answer to the question 
of the level of generality with which pertinent background practice should 
be described that is not at least partially question-begging. In the end, there 
is no escaping the need for case-by-case judgments. In my judgment, 
however, the Court’s decisions in Rizzo and Lyons were a leap too far: at 
least in the absence of a far more cogent, precedent-based justification than 
the Court managed to provide, its rulings in those cases overstepped the 
bounds of properly judicial decisionmaking. 
It may be a mark of the potency of Professor Redish’s arguments—
which were less cautious and qualified than those that I have offered—that 
the Supreme Court has subsequently responded, apparently deliberately, to 
the rule of law objections to which its past practice had given rise. The 
Court has arrested the growth of Younger doctrine. The signal development 
came in a 1989 decision, written by Justice Scalia, that held Younger did 
not require abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding that did 
not involve the coercive enforcement of state law.113 To require abstention 
outside the context of coercive proceedings “would make a mockery of the 
rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to 
decide a case in deference to the States,”114 the Court reasoned. The Court 
has further held that abstention is appropriate only in actions seeking 
equitable or other discretionary relief.115 And it has curbed if not entirely 
eliminated some abstention-like doctrines of relatively marginal 
significance.116 
Nevertheless, the Court has not eliminated the main elements of 
abstention doctrine as they existed at the time of Redish’s critique. The 
cores of the Pullman and Younger doctrines remain. Although the Court 
has said that abstention is permissible only in cases involving equitable or 
discretionary remedies, it has filed down this rule’s teeth by allowing lower 
courts to “stay” action in federal suits pending the outcome of state court 
proceedings, even when they are forbidden formally to abstain.117 For most 
if not all practical purposes, the distinction between abstaining and staying 
 
113 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 373 (1989). 
114 Id. at 368. 
115 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996). For critical discussion of 
Quackenbush, including a skeptical assessment of its treatment of precedent, see HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 5, at 1063–65. 
116 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311–12 (2006) (holding that the “probate exception” to 
federal jurisdiction applies only to cases of in rem jurisdiction in which a state court has already 
assumed jurisdiction over the res); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (holding that 
“the Constitution does not exclude domestic relations cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by 
statute to the federal courts”). 
117 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721. 
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a federal action pending the completion of state court proceedings makes 
no difference whatsoever.118 
With abstention doctrines pruned a bit from where they stood in 1984 
but not fundamentally altered, much less eliminated, a version of the rule of 
law question remains to be asked and answered: Are the core abstention 
doctrines that remain in place, and continuing judicial practice in applying 
them, an inherent affront to rule of law ideals? 
In my view, the answer to that question is “no.” To begin with, as 
suggested by what I have said already, any root-and-branch condemnation 
of abstention doctrine would have seemed to me to be too strong even in 
the 1970s and 1980s. As David Shapiro argued, abstention has honorable 
precursors and analogues in our legal tradition, including the nonexercise 
of jurisdiction under equitable maxims, the forum non conveniens doctrine, 
judge-imposed demands for the exhaustion of remedies, and discretionary 
standards governing the exercise of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.119 As 
experience with these discretionary, mostly judge-shaped analogues 
suggests, there is no reason that abstention doctrine and practice could not 
be disciplined.120 In my judgment, there is now enough discipline to satisfy 
the requisites of the rule of law. 
What is more, even if one agreed with Redish’s rule of law critique of 
the development of abstention doctrines, highly important rule of law 
values would tell strongly against the adoption of his proposed remedy, 
involving those doctrines’ total abandonment. The reason involves the role 
of precedent in American law.121 The doctrine of precedent admittedly 
includes many complexities, especially in constitutional law. As Professor 
Redish has emphasized, the Supreme Court treats the doctrine as one of 
policy.122 Particular decisions are undoubtedly vulnerable to overruling.123 
The important point, however, is that rule of law ideals require reasonable 
stability. Although the Court can overturn almost any single precedent that 
it believes sufficiently badly reasoned, it cannot too dramatically alter the 
legal landscape all at once. In determining which past decisions most 
deserve overruling, time and acceptance matter.124 A good deal of time has 
passed since the decisions in Pullman and Younger. 
Whether precedents are workable, and conduce to sensible results, 
matters too. The Younger doctrine, in particular, stands up well when tested 
 
118 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1064. 
119 See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 547–60. 
120 See id. at 575 (defending judicial discretion in conjunction with a “principle of preference” that 
courts should decide cases within their jurisdiction or provide a reason for not doing so based on text, 
context, or common law). 
121 See Fallon, supra note 77. 
122 See REDISH, supra note 50, at 44–50.  
123 See id. 
124 See Fallon, supra note 77, at 1146–50. 
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against these criteria. Under modern constitutional doctrine, “it is hard to 
imagine a criminal prosecution in which a constitutional claim could not be 
raised; and it would be unworkable if every prosecution could be 
interrupted by suit for a federal injunction at any stage in the 
proceedings.”125 Although Younger can be controversial as applied to some 
cases, its basic premise that federal courts should not interrupt pending 
state criminal prosecutions is an eminently sensible one. It commanded the 
votes of eight of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court in 1971, including 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who ardently championed aggressive 
intervention by federal courts to protect federal rights in other contexts.126 
Over the decades since 1941, Pullman, too, has proved workable, and 
procedures have been developed to reduce the delays in the adjudication of 
federal constitutional claims that it once occasioned.127 
If revived today, Professor Redish’s rule of law argument would 
border on internal contradiction. In the name of judicial restraint, it would 
ask the Supreme Court to demolish doctrines that have structured judicial 
federalism, and done so reasonably successfully, for many decades. In the 
name of the rule of law, it would also upset the law-based expectations of 
past Congresses that jurisdictional legislation would be interpreted in light 
of longstanding background understandings that federal courts sometimes 
should and would abstain.128 
V. ABSTENTION IN RELATION TO OTHER FEDERAL COURTS DOCTRINES 
So far I have looked at abstention in relative isolation from other 
federal courts doctrines. But we may gain perspective on the important 
notions of legal and interpretive legitimacy on which Professor Redish 
rested his critique of abstention if we widen the lens of inquiry. Above, I 
characterized Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function as embracing an interpretive theory under which the 
Supreme Court must treat statutes as meaning what they would appear to 
mean in a relatively narrow semantic or policy context. If adopted across 
the board as an entailment of the constitutional separation of powers, 
Professor Redish’s stringent approach would, I believe, condemn a myriad 
of federal courts doctrines as illegitimate. On the one hand, this recognition 
 
125 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1095. 
126 See id. at 1095–96 (discussing Younger’s near unanimity). 
127 See generally id. at 1069–75 (discussing the procedural aspects of Pullman abstention). Among 
the procedural developments, nearly all states have established mechanisms that allow federal courts to 
“certify” state issues for resolution by state supreme courts, without requiring one of the parties to 
initiate proceedings in a state trial court. See id. at 1072–75. 
128 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of 
Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 265, 274 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (“[L]egislative action is 
conditioned by expectations of court behavior and cannot be comprehended independently of those 
expectations.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
872 
corroborates the arguments that I have advanced already by confirming that 
his standards of legal and interpretive legitimacy are too rigid. On the other 
hand, acknowledgment that the Supreme Court has very often taken an 
extremely liberal interpretive approach in dealing with jurisdictional 
statutes indicates the continuing pertinence of the legal legitimacy 
questions that Professor Redish’s 1984 article raised. By looking at and 
reflecting on a number of federal courts doctrines besides abstention, we 
can hope to make progress toward developing general standards of legal 
and interpretive legitimacy, or at least toward understanding the criteria 
that such standards would need to satisfy. 
A. Potential Implications of Professor Redish’s Interpretive Approach 
If the premise were granted that the Supreme Court acts ultra vires 
whenever it interprets statutes based on a broad view of their semantic or 
policy contexts to reach conclusions that a narrower focus would not 
support, a number of federal courts doctrines besides abstention would 
almost certainly stand condemned. Although I cannot attempt a precise 
tally, some revealing suggestions emerge from Professor Shapiro’s 1985 
survey, in which he identified numerous contexts in which the courts have 
read jurisdictional grants as including an implied authorization of discretion 
regarding the jurisdiction’s exercise, and from Barry Friedman’s 1990 
article, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal 
Jurisdiction.129 Friedman expanded the scope of inquiry even further 
beyond abstention than Shapiro had by identifying lines of cases in which 
the Court has adopted a broad view of a statute’s semantic or policy context 
in order to hold that it did not impose limitations on previously existing 
federal jurisdiction, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Shapiro’s and Friedman’s examples—which would suggest that if 
abstention doctrines are “illegitimate,” then a number of other federal 
courts doctrines that involve statutory interpretation are illegitimate too—
include the following: 
Forum non conveniens. Applying traditional forum non conveniens 
principles, federal courts have long treated otherwise applicable 
jurisdictional and venue statutes as permitting them to dismiss cases when 
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice 
identify another available forum as more appropriate for resolving a 
dispute.130 Although 28 U.S.C. § 1404 now provides an express 
authorization for transfers of cases from one district court to another, the 
 
129 Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).  
130 See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 555–57. 
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traditional doctrine of forum non conveniens continues to apply when the 
appropriate court is not one to which the statute authorizes transfers.131 
The Anti-Injunction Act.132 Since the early days of constitutional 
history, the United States Code has included an anti-injunction statute 
barring federal courts from issuing injunctions against state court 
proceedings.133 With little regard for the statutory language, the Supreme 
Court inaugurated a tradition of recognizing implied exceptions as early as 
1836.134 A 1948 revision of the statute created a series of express 
exceptions to the anti-injunction mandate.135 The Court, however, has felt 
free to continue to take interpretive liberties with the statute, at least from 
time to time. In Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,136 the Court ruled 
that the Anti-Injunction Act included, or at least would tolerate, an implied 
exception for injunctions sought by the United States. In Mitchum v. 
Foster,137 which I discussed above, the Court held—oxymoronically, in the 
eyes of Professor Redish138—that a statute licensing suits against state 
officials for constitutional violations impliedly creates an “expressly 
authorized” exception to the anti-injunction stricture. 
Arising under jurisdiction. In 1875, a Reconstruction Congress 
enacted legislation giving the federal district courts jurisdiction of all civil 
actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States.139 In conferring “arising under” jurisdiction, the statute, now 
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, copies the language that Article III employs 
in defining the permissible outer bounds of federal jurisdiction. In a 
statement on the Senate floor, the law’s principal drafter averred that it 
would “confer the whole [jurisdictional] power which the Constitution” 
authorizes.140 Yet the Supreme Court, apparently for policy reasons, has 
always read § 1331 as conferring a more narrowly circumscribed 
jurisdiction than the Constitution would permit. Among other things, the 
Court has held that § 1331 jurisdiction does not extend to any case in which 
a federal question does not appear on the face of the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint, even when the case will predictably turn, as a practical 
matter, on a federal issue introduced by way of defense or a reply to a 
 
131 The transfer statute would not, for example, allow transfer of a case to a court in another 
country, but neither does it deprive a district court of the ability to abstain on forum non conveniens 
grounds. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
132 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
133 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1030. 
134 See Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400, 405–06 (1836). 
135 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1031–32. 
136 352 U.S. 220 (1957). 
137 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
138 See Redish, supra note 13, at 87. 
139 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 774–76. 
140 See id. at 775 (quoting Senator Matthew Hale Carpenter). 
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defense.141 Even when a federal question appears on the face of a well-
pleaded complaint, the Court has held that § 1331 jurisdiction will not lie 
unless federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of action or the federal 
question embedded in a state law cause of action is sufficiently important 
to merit “having a federal forum for the issue.”142 
Official immunity in § 1983 actions. Read literally, § 1983 creates a 
cause of action against every state and local government official who 
violates “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws” of the United States.143 It makes no reference to official 
immunity. The Supreme Court, however, has held that officials who are 
sued for damages enjoy either “absolute” or “qualified” immunity from 
suit, depending on the character of their official functions.144 The Court has 
sometimes suggested that the statute should be construed as incorporating 
immunities previously recognized in common law.145 But the leading case 
establishing the currently applicable qualified immunity standard justified 
its holding solely on policy grounds, without reference either to the 
language of § 1983 or to Congress’s purposes in enacting it.146 
Habeas corpus. Through nearly all of the twentieth century, federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction to review state criminal convictions came from a 
statute first enacted in 1867 that authorized the writ for persons “restrained 
of . . . liberty in violation of the constitution.”147 Often with little or even no 
regard for the statutory language, the Supreme Court crafted rules 
precluding the exercise of the jurisdiction in cases involving unexhausted 
state remedies, procedural default, and repetitive petitions.148 Congress very 
substantially revised the statutory framework in 1996,149 with the effect of 
either reinforcing or displacing much of the Court’s common-law-like 
handiwork. Even now, however, the Court has apparently retained an 
important judicially crafted limitation on the availability of federal habeas 
relief: it has adhered to its prior position that federal habeas courts should 
 
141 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). For discussion of the merits 
of the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 776–80.  
142 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 319 (2005). 
143 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
144 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
145 See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (“If an official was accorded immunity 
from tort actions at common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871, the Court next 
considers whether § 1983’s history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same 
immunity in § 1983 actions.”). 
146 The leading case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald was not a § 1983 case but one involving the 
immunities of federal officials sued directly under the Constitution in Bivens actions. See 457 U.S. at 
805. But the Court, in crafting immunity rules for Bivens actions, announced that it would apply the 
same immunity standards in suits against state officials under § 1983. See id. at 818 n.30. 
147 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. 
148 See Friedman, supra note 129, at 12. 
149 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
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not grant relief based on Fourth Amendment claims that were fully and 
fairly litigated in state court, even though the text of the revised statute 
includes no such exclusion.150 
Presumption against jurisdiction stripping. Apart from the arguably 
special case of habeas corpus,151 the Supreme Court has not established 
clear constitutional limits on the authority of Congress to strip the federal 
courts of all jurisdiction over constitutional claims.152 The Court has 
affirmed repeatedly, however, that it will not interpret a statute as depriving 
the federal courts of jurisdiction unless Congress has made its intent to do 
so extraordinarily clear.153 Application of the Court’s clear statement rule 
has sometimes resulted in statutory “interpretations” that are difficult to 
reconcile with statutory language and that find little or no support in 
Congress’s transparently motivating purposes.154 
Scope of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The statute that 
authorizes Supreme Court review of final state court judgments in cases 
involving federal issues does not expressly limit the Court’s review to 
federal issues.155 Nevertheless, in Murdock v. City of Memphis,156 the Court 
held that it would ordinarily review only federal, and not state, issues that a 
state court had decided. Commentators have argued that this exclusion runs 
contrary to the intent of the Reconstruction Congress that enacted the 
original version of the current statute as well as to the statute’s plain 
language.157 The obvious explanation for the Court’s result lies in notions 
of sound jurisdictional policy, including a desire to respect the status of 
state courts as ultimate expositors of state law, and possibly—though only 
barely so in the case of the Court’s original decision—in the policy of 
 
150 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not 
Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 1028–29 (2010) (noting that Stone remains good law following 
passage of the AEDPA). 
151 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008) (holding that a statute precluding the 
exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction over petitions by detainees who fell within the traditional scope 
of the writ, in the absence of any constitutionally adequate substitute, violated the Suspension Clause). 
152 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 308–14 (discussing relevant authorities and the 
questions that they leave unresolved). 
153 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 
(1988). 
154 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 
423 & n.123 (2010) (identifying “cases in which the Court has rewritten or mangled a statute in the 
application of a clear statement rule”). 
155 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
156 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635 (1875). 
157 See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional 
Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1291, 1319 (1986).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
876 
constitutional avoidance, which counsels the adoption of otherwise 
plausible interpretations that avoid serious constitutional issues.158 
B. Legitimacy in Context 
In thinking about the legitimacy of the just-listed doctrines and of the 
judicial role in crafting them, we can begin by considering two perspectives 
that define nearly polar alternatives. According to one view, most or all of 
the doctrines that I have just laid out should be deemed illegitimate for the 
same reasons that Professor Redish regards abstention as illegitimate: they 
usurp congressional prerogatives in establishing jurisdictional policy. Once 
again, however, the position that so many well-settled doctrines are 
illegitimate seems to me to be not only practically but also jurisprudentially 
unsound. Regardless of whether doctrines were right or even legitimate at 
the outset, they can achieve legal legitimacy by becoming woven into the 
fabric of law and surrounding, accreting expectations.159 As the legal 
philosopher H.L.A. Hart emphasized, standards of legality and legal 
legitimacy necessarily have their ultimate foundations in the social practice 
of judges and other officials,160 not the commands of a sovereign lawgiver 
or the ideals of legal theorists.161 Neither commands nor ideals are law 
unless accepted standards or a “rule of recognition”162 identifies them as 
such. Conversely, norms that judges follow, and believe that they and other 
officials have duties to follow, normally achieve validation as law through 
that pattern of acceptance. Although any good legal theory must 
contemplate the possibility of most or even all officials being mistaken 
about particular issues of legal validity, no theory rooted in social practice 
can plausibly characterize too many officials as being mistaken about too 
much. Professor Redish’s standards for gauging legal legitimacy would run 
 
158 Although Murdock’s holding that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court 
holdings of state law has important parallels in the ruling in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938), that federal courts sitting in diversity must follow state court precedents on state law issues, the 
Court decided Murdock more than sixty years before it embraced the Erie rule as a constitutional 
dictate. Accordingly, it seems highly unlikely that the avoidance doctrine—to which the Court did not 
allude—had any influence on the actual decision in Murdock. Even in a post-Erie legal universe, it is 
far from clear that Erie would bar the Supreme Court from deciding state law issues in a “case” initially 
decided by a state court and properly within its constitutionally contemplated appellate jurisdiction, 
which extends to “Cases,” not issues. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Any potential tension with Erie 
that might result from the Supreme Court’s ruling on state law issues in cases otherwise properly before 
it would be ameliorated if the Court’s state law holdings were deemed to lack the authority to bind state 
courts in future cases, with the result that state courts would be the ultimate expositors of state law in all 
cases not reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
159 See Fallon, supra note 77, at 1146–50. 
160 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116, 256 (2d ed. 1994). On the capacity of Hartian 
theory to illuminate American constitutional practice, see generally Fallon, supra note 77. 
161 See HART, supra note 160, at 44–49 (debunking theories that equate law with the commands of 
a sovereign lawgiver). 
162 See id. at 94–110. 
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afoul of this precept. With generations of judges now having accepted and 
enforced the doctrines described above, it is difficult to maintain that all of 
them could be legally illegitimate today. The thought that large swathes of 
doctrine are legally illegitimate ought to provoke a rethinking of any 
measure of illegitimacy that would dictate this conclusion. 
An opposite approach, which is roughly that of Professors Friedman 
and Shapiro, is to rationalize nearly all of the existing doctrinal structure 
and the interpretive methodology that has given rise to it. Both stipulate 
that Congress, within very broad limits, can impose any jurisdictional 
mandates that it wishes.163 But both also argue that longstanding 
interpretive practice, and the Constitution as read in light of that practice, 
justify the courts in resisting the conclusion that Congress has imposed 
mandates to exercise jurisdiction whenever the courts believe that such 
mandates would be imprudent.164 Friedman goes further by maintaining that 
the Supreme Court can justifiably decline to interpret statutes that would 
most naturally be read to restrict federal jurisdiction as having done so.165 
Under his proposed “dialogic approach,” the courts are entitled to place 
considerable reliance on their own views about sound jurisdictional policy, 
without always needing to play the role of Congress’s faithful agent, when 
construing statutes bearing on federal jurisdiction.166 
Although I agree that courts can play an important role in fine-tuning 
jurisdictional legislation under the separation of powers,167 I also believe 
that more limits are needed than Friedman appears to contemplate when he 
treats it as legitimate for the Supreme Court, when it disagrees with 
Congress’s jurisdictional policy choices, to “constru[e] its way around [a] 
statute, no matter how implausible the construction.”168 One can accept that 
long-settled doctrines are legally legitimate today, because adequately 
 
163 See Friedman, supra note 129, at 48–49; Shapiro, supra note 15, at 583–84. 
164 See Friedman, supra note 129, at 10; Shapiro, supra note 15, at 545–47, 570–74. 
165 See Friedman, supra note 129, at 48–49. 
166 See id. at 48–49 (maintaining that questions such as whether the federal courts must “exercise 
every bit of jurisdiction imposed upon them by Congress” receive their answers from a dialogic 
interchange between Congress and the Supreme Court in which the Court can and sometimes does resist 
congressional policy decisions). 
167 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 408:  
[Experience demonstrates] how difficult it is to expect that Congress will, by virtue of detailed 
textual specification, be able to get things right the first time, or, when initial legislative efforts 
misfire, to fix things later. There are thus real pitfalls in the assumption that Congress can and 
should be expected to resolve matters in legislative text without the aid of courts acting as junior 
partners in shaping a workable legal system. 
Meltzer based his conclusion on case studies that included Congress’s enactment of a supplemental 
jurisdictional provision, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006), in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), see Meltzer, supra, at 398–403, its 
amendments of the federal officer removal statute, § 1442(a)(1), see Meltzer, supra, at 400–01 n.229, 
and the Anti-Injunction Act, § 2283, see Meltzer, supra, at 407–08 n.254. 
168 Friedman, supra note 129, at 48–49. 
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justified by stare decisis, without also concluding that the interpretive 
assumptions that would have been necessary to defend those doctrines’ 
initial development are also legally legitimate in every instance. Questions 
involving appropriate and legitimate methodologies of statutory 
interpretation in cases of first impression are not only distinctive but also 
distinctively difficult. 
Having distinguished questions about the legitimacy of settled 
doctrines from the question of legitimate interpretive methodology in cases 
of first impression, especially in the domain of federal courts law, I must 
confess immediately that I have no sharp answer to the latter question. 
Nevertheless, critical reflection on Abstention, Separation of Powers, and 
the Limits of the Judicial Function—viewed now as engaged in a highly 
illuminating, even edifying dialogue with Professors Friedman and 
Shapiro—will generate some significant conclusions. 
As my discussion of the legitimacy of abstention doctrines has 
indicated, the most recurring analytical division in the literature on 
statutory interpretation pits textualists against purposivists. If the case study 
of abstention sheds any light, however, an even more important divide may 
separate those who take a broader view from those who take a narrower 
view of a statute’s interpretive context—its “semantic context” in the case 
of textualists and its “policy context” in the case of purposivists.169 The 
broader the interpretive context that an interpreter deems appropriate, the 
greater the latitude that will emerge for interpretive judgment and for 
what—in the case of federal courts doctrines that I reviewed above—might 
fairly be characterized as policy-driven statutory interpretation. 
If this conclusion is correct, then the crucial question is how to fix the 
breadth of the semantic or policy context within which statutes ought to be 
interpreted. In Part III of this Essay, I argued against Professor Redish’s 
insistence that considerations of democratic theory dictated that the 
relevant context should always be defined narrowly. I did not, however, 
endorse the polar opposite view that courts should always adopt the 
broadest possible understanding of the semantic or policy context in which 
Congress enacted a statute. 
In defending the Supreme Court’s entitlement to adopt a broad view in 
every case in which a narrower view would produce bad policy (as seen 
from the Court’s perspective), Professor Friedman appears to rely on the 
notion, which Professor Shapiro defends expressly,170 that acceptance of 
broad judicial discretion in the interpretation of jurisdictional legislation 
will yield good results. And if we further ask by what gauge the goodness 
of results ought to be measured, we can tease out two deeper assumptions. 
The first is one of genuine, specialized judicial expertise concerning the 
 
169 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
170 See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 574, 588. 
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consequences of the exercise of federal jurisdiction.171 Better than 
Congress, the courts understand how litigation works in practice. The 
second assumption is one of widely shared public values in light of which 
the practical consequences of jurisdictional allocations can be assessed. In 
other words, by bringing specialized expertise to bear on the interpretation 
of jurisdictional statutes, courts will help to establish a jurisdictional 
scheme that Congress and the public will rightly accept, at least in the long 
run, as well or reasonably designed. 
Although I feel considerable sympathy for this line of analysis, for 
reasons stated earlier, it also needs to be recognized that reasonable people 
can, and do, reasonably disagree about many propositions of fact and 
value.172 As debates about the proper reach of abstention doctrine vividly 
illustrated during the 1970s and 1980s, reasonable people can certainly 
disagree about the respective competencies of state and federal courts, the 
weights of competing state and federal interests, and the amount of 
discretion that a reasonable Congress would have delegated to the federal 
courts. In the end, the question of when judges are entitled to take a broad 
view in order to resist conclusions about statutory meaning that they think 
improvident inevitably requires the exercise of judgment, including 
predictive judgment about what the actual, practical effects of alternative 
constructions would turn out to be. And if history teaches anything, it may 
be that the requisites of good judgment defy expression in clear, ex ante 
rules. 
For the most part, I believe that assumptions of judicial expertise and 
broadly shared long-term values—which would tend to support the 
Supreme Court in taking a broad view of the relevant interpretive context—
are likely to be better founded in the domain of federal courts law than in 
many if not most other fields. Wisely, in the articles that I have discussed, 
Professors Friedman and Shapiro did not offer general theories of statutory 
interpretation but theories about the judicial role in interpreting 
jurisdictional legislation. If there is any practical and normative matter with 
respect to which judges possess genuine expertise, it involves the 
appropriate distribution of judicial functions. Disagreement with judicial 
choices, even if reasonable, will typically prove passing. Under these 
circumstances, the Supreme Court should be entitled to focus on what it 
takes to be long-term public values, occasionally in contrast with 
immediately prevailing sentiments. For example, an appropriately long-
term view may have justified the Court in resisting the conclusion that 
Reconstruction Congresses—whatever their immediate attitudes toward 
state courts—should be interpreted as having mandated jurisdictional 
 
171 See id. at 574. 
172 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1364–69 (2006). 
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revolutions that would have demeaned state courts and thrust potentially 
insupportable burdens onto federal courts. 
Again, however, I hesitate to generalize too much. As I have said, 
even in the forbidding intricacies of federal courts law, reasonable experts 
sometimes differ passionately, and the publicly contested stakes can grow 
high. When we acknowledge this to be the case, one important conclusion 
follows directly: just as it may be impossible to lay down determinate rules 
for good interpretive judgment, so it may be impossible to formulate 
sharply edged conditions of interpretive legitimacy and illegitimacy. 
Another significant conclusion may then emerge as a corollary: given 
reasonable disagreement, we should refrain from charging illegitimacy too 
readily, lest we devalue the term. In judging legitimacy and illegitimacy as 
much as in determining the meaning of a statute, everything depends on 
context. For me, at least, this is a sobering conclusion, which I draw with 
more confidence than satisfaction, for it generates infinitely more questions 
than it resolves. 
CONCLUSION 
The legitimacy question that Professor Martin Redish framed for 
debate in Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function remains as fresh, important, and perplexing today as it was when 
he first raised it. We have to accept that courts will make mistakes, but it is 
a stronger ground for outrage when they act ultra vires. In this Essay, I 
have argued that Professor Redish was wrong to conclude that the best 
reading of the Constitution and relevant statutes precludes federal judicial 
abstention under all circumstances. I have further argued that the adoption 
of Redish’s implicit standards for judicial legitimacy would have the 
practically and jurisprudentially untenable consequence of threatening a 
myriad of other federal courts doctrines. 
My criticisms of Professor Redish’s arguments aside, his raising of the 
question of abstention doctrine’s legitimacy was an enduring contribution 
to legal thought and debate, especially but not exclusively in the domain of 
federal courts law. In taking up that question, I have meant to pay tribute to 
its profundity without pretense of having spoken the final word. Sometimes 
the deepest questions will simply not yield to sharply etched, once-and-for-
all answers. 
